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SHOT THROUGH THE HEART: THE FDA
GIVES ALL HEALTH CARE COMPANY
EXECUTIVES A BAD NAME UNDER THE
CONTROVERSIAL STRICT-LIABILITY
MISDEMEANOR PROVISION OF THE
FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, AND COSMETIC ACT
INTRODUCTION
The government is pulling out a dusty old weapon from its arsenal to
use as it embarks on a seemingly tyrannical mission against health care
company executives.1 Recently,2 the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)3
and the Department of Justice (DOJ)4 expressed an intention to aggressively
prosecute high-ranking executives of health care companies5 through the

1. See Barry Meier, When Heart Devices Fail, Who Should Be Blamed?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
21, 2010, at B1 [hereinafter When Heart Devices Fail].
[T]he Obama administration intends to push for more prosecutions of corporate
officials, a move that is likely to please patient advocates but also to touch off intense
debate.
John M. Taylor III, counselor to the F.D.A. commissioner, Dr. Margaret Hamburg, said
that the agency would soon start training agency personnel about the reach of the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 . . . .
Id. The Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that over a ten-year span, only 271 individuals were
charged with such violations. Brent J. Gurney, Howard M. Shapiro & Robert A. Mays, The Crime
of Doing Nothing: Strict Liability for Corporate Officers Under the FDCA, WILMERHALE F-27
n.45 (Dec. 3, 2007), available at http://www.wilmerhale.com/files/Publication/7b1c0866-a547
-48c7-86d0-04d0449c03d7/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c5eda281-2dae-4154-a0f813b817f25b52/The_Crime_of_Doing_Nothing.pdf.
2. Historically, the FDA and DOJ would not bring misdemeanor criminal charges against
high-level executives when they neither participated in nor knew of the illegal conduct. Karen F.
Green et al., FDA Plans to Increase Strict Liability Criminal Prosecutions of Corporate
Executives, WILMERHALE (Mar. 11, 2010), available at http://www.wilmerhale.com/fda_plans
_to_increase_strict_liability_criminal_prosecutions_of_corporate_executives_03-11-2010/.
3. The FDA is a constituent agency of the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services
(HHS). About FDA, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices
/default.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2012).
4. References made to the DOJ refer collectively to the U.S. Attorney’s Offices for all
districts across the United States. See infra note 26 (providing more information on how the FDA
and DOJ operate to investigate and prosecute violations of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic
Act).
5. Letter from Margaret A. Hamburg, M.D., Comm’r of Food and Drugs, to The Honorable
Charles E. Grassley, Ranking Member, Senate Comm. on Fin. (Mar. 4, 2010), available at
http://grassley.senate.gov/about/upload/FDA-3-4-10-Hamburg-letter-to-Grassley-re-GAO-reporton-OCI.pdf. This letter explained steps taken to address the Committee’s recommendation that the
FDA “increase the appropriate use of misdemeanor prosecutions, a valuable enforcement tool, to
hold responsible corporate officials accountable.” Id. It also noted that the “FDA will enhance its
procedures to support the development of debarment and disqualification actions, and . . . will
clarify the circumstances under which such administrative actions may proceed concurrently with
pending criminal investigations and prosecutions.” Id.
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use of the controversial strict-liability misdemeanor provision6 of the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA).7 Without having to prove
anything more than the executive’s position on the corporate ladder,8 the
government can sit back and watch guilty pleas roll in from powerless
companies and their executives. The careers of many of these professional
men and women will come to an undeserved and abrupt end when they are
branded with a scarlet criminal record.9 The impetus behind this “new
approach . . . reflects frustration with corporate recidivism even in the face
of ramped-up fines, penalties and disgorgements.”10 Yet, the proposed
means are not narrowly tailored to achieve the ends. For example, when the

6. See 21 U.S.C. § 331 (2006) (detailing prohibited activities); 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (2006)
(imposing misdemeanor punishments of imprisonment for not more than one year or a fine of not
more than $1,000 or both for violations of § 331). If any such violation constitutes a second
conviction or is found to have been committed “with the intent to defraud or mislead,” the
violation becomes a felony, carrying a maximum of three years of imprisonment and a fine of not
more than $10,000 or both. Id. Since the Supreme Court’s endorsement, in United States v. Park,
of the strict-liability provision in the FDCA, there have only been thirteen cases “in which the
government charged a corporate executive with a misdemeanor FDCA violation based solely on
the executive’s ‘responsible relation’ to the violation.” Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-17, F-25
n.39. Records show that
the overall number of FDCA criminal prosecutions has been small, and misdemeanor
prosecutions have been rare or nonexistent. This conservative use of the “responsible
corporate officer” doctrine has also shown itself in a series of major settlements reached
in criminal investigations of major [health care] companies since 2000. Each of these
cases presented circumstances in which the government clearly could have charged
individual executives with misdemeanor (if not felony) FDCA violations, or demanded
misdemeanor pleas as part of any settlement. Yet none of these major settlements has
involved individual criminal charges under the FDCA.
Id. at F-18 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
7. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399a (2006).
8. John W. Lundquist & Sandra L. Conroy, Defending Against Food & Drug Prosecutions,
THE CHAMPION, July 1997, at 20 (“[The FDA] does not often refer cases for criminal prosecution,
but when it does, it can be a formidable adversary. Among the weapons at its disposal are a
statutory scheme imposing strict liability on offenders and a doctrine of corporate responsibility
that allows the FDA to target virtually any high-ranking corporate official simply by virtue of the
position he or she occupies, even though the defendant performed no acts in furtherance of the
alleged criminal violation.”).
9. See generally Daniel R. Margolis, Mark R. Hellerer & Aaron S. Dyer, FDA to Bring More
Criminal Charges Against Executives for Companies’ FDCA Violations, PILLSBURY CLIENT
ALERT (Mar. 9, 2010), http://www.pillsburylaw.com/siteFiles/Publications/D98DF569EA
917C29C8CE406316FA213C.pdf (discussing the trend of bringing misdemeanor criminal actions
against corporate executives under the FDCA). “[I]ndividuals convicted [of unintentional
violations] are potentially vulnerable to administrative exclusion from federal health care
programs, which in practice can rule out future employment in the health care industry.” Green et
al., supra note 2.
10. Ken Stier, HHS Learns from SEC: Fraudster Execs Will be Barred from Drug Industry,
CNN MONEY (June 16, 2010), http://money.cnn.com/2010/06/04/news/companies/astrazeneca
_pharmaceutical_fines.fortune/index.htm. Lewis Morris, chief counsel to the Inspector General,
explains that the government is “going to start to use that authority in the appropriate
circumstances to get high level executives out of companies, so that the company has a better shot
at changing its behavior.” Id.
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failure of medical devices results in serious injury or death, using highranking executives as scapegoats,11 rather than charging individuals who are
directly responsible for the corporation’s FDCA violation, will not combat
recidivism12 to achieve the ultimate goal of protecting the patients.13 From
the government’s point of view, this may be the quickest and easiest way,
but it is not the most effective and fairest means to deter corporate criminal
behavior.
Instead, the government should conduct focused investigations of the
specific sect of the corporation responsible for the particular FDCA
violation(s) to reveal the direct culprit(s), who are often in a lower echelon
of the corporate hierarchy.14 To achieve this end, Congress should amend
the misdemeanor provision of the FDCA, which currently allows corporate
executives to be charged with crimes committed by employees or agents of
their companies,15 even if they had no knowledge of the criminal activity.16
An open-ended, strict-liability criminal offense such as this could have the
chilling effect of putting innocent businesspeople behind bars.17 The current
policies behind investigations and prosecutions under the penalty provisions
of the FDCA do not actually result in imprisoning guilty individuals.18 An
amendment to this provision should require the government to prove
criminal intent to some degree, depending on whether it chooses to charge
under a misdemeanor or felony offense.19
11. This is not to say that all figurehead executives, CEOs, or presidents of companies are not
culpable. See United States v. Prigmore, 243 F.3d 1, 3, 24 (1st Cir. 2001) (arguing that there was
“substantial evidence” that the corporate executive defendants had in fact committed serious
conspiracy “to defraud and impair the functioning of the [FDA] in connection with its oversight
and regulation of [Class III] medical devices”).
12. When Heart Devices Fail, supra note 1. In this note, however, I argue that this is the
wrong means to achieve that end.
13. Id.
14. Oftentimes, managers of certain divisions of a company are directly responsible for
ensuring compliance with regulations and monitoring a smaller group of employees. These
individuals are likely to be more knowledgeable about violations and preventing them than the
highest ranking figurehead of the corporation. See Assaf Hamdani, Essay, Mens Rea and the Cost
of Ignorance, 93 VA. L. REV. 415, 447 (2007).
15. Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-20.
16. Margolis et al., supra note 9, at 1.
17. Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-18. This is not to say that there are not circumstances
where figurehead executives may be criminally liable. In those situations, they should be held
accountable.
18. In United States v. Guidant LLC, federal prosecutors and the executives on trial entered
into plea agreements, dropping the prison sentence in exchange for higher monetary fines. United
States v. Guidant LLC, 708 F. Supp. 2d 903, 921–22 (D. Minn. 2010).
19. In addition, the DOJ can impose administrative enforcement and civil sanctions if it finds
criminal prosecution is inappropriate. These include “impos[ing] a ‘clinical hold’ on the drug or
device, seek injunctive relief against violators, seize products and materials, debar or suspend
organizations and individuals from operating in the regulated field, and impose civil monetary
penalties.” Lundquist & Conroy, supra note 8, at 21 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 312.42; 21 U.S.C.
§ 332(a); 21 U.S.C. § 334; 21 U.S.C. § 335(a); 21 U.S.C. §§ 333(f), 335(b), and 21 C.F.R. Part
17).
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This note will focus on the criminal prosecutions under the FDCA of
high-ranking executives of Class III medical device manufacturing
companies.20 In light of the recent announcements to aggressively prosecute
executives of medical device corporations,21 and the prevalence of repeat
violations of the FDCA by these companies,22 congressional action is
necessary. Part I presents an overview of the FDA as a regulatory and
enforcement agency with particular emphasis on the FDCA. Part II

20. The term medical “device” is defined within the FDCA as the following:
[A]n instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in vitro reagent,
or other similar or related article, including a component, part, or accessory which is-(1) recognized in the official National Formulary, or the United States
Pharmacopeia, or any supplement to them,
(2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the cure,
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other animals, or
(3) intended to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or other
animals, and which does not achieve its primary intended purposes through
chemical action within or on the body of man or other animals and which is not
dependent upon being metabolized for the achievement of its primary intended
purposes.
21 U.S.C. § 321(h).
There are 3 FDA regulatory classifications of medical devices: Class I, Class II and
Class III. The classifications are assigned by the risk the medical device presents to the
patient . . . . As the classification level increases, the risk to the patient and FDA
regulatory control increase. . . .
....
Class III medical devices have the most stringent regulatory controls. For Class III
medical devices, sufficient information is not available to assure safety and
effectiveness through the application of General Controls and Special Controls. Class
III devices usually support or sustain human life, are of substantial importance in
preventing impairment of human health, or present a potentially unreasonable risk of
illness or injury to the patient. Typically, Pre-Market Approval (PMA) submission to
the FDA is required to allow marketing of a Class III medical device. . . . Examples of
Class III devices that require PMA are: replacement heart valves, silicone gel-filled
breast implants, and implanted cerebella stimulators.
Gary Syring, Overview: FDA Regulation of Medical Devices, QUALITY & REG. ASSOCIATES
(May 6, 2003), available at http://www.qrasupport.com/FDA_MED_ DEVICE.html. For a
critique of the FDA Class III medical device pre- and post-market approval process, see generally
Michael VanBuren, Note, Closing the Loopholes in the Regulation of Medical Devices: The Need
for Congress to Reevaluate Medical Device Regulation, 17 HEALTH MATRIX 441 (2007). The
FDCA regulates several industries, and thus applies to food, pharmaceutical, medical device, and
cosmetic companies; therefore, I caution the reader that my proposal to abolish the misdemeanor
provision will, by default, affect all entities and individuals subject to the FDCA. See Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399.
21. See supra note 1.
22. John T. Boese, Beth C. McClain & Benjamin Hernandez-Stern, Healthcare Behind Bars:
The Use of Criminal Prosecutions in Forcing Corporate Compliance, 3 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L.
91, 94 (2009).
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examines two seminal Supreme Court decisions23 which established the
controversial responsible corporate officer doctrine that enables the DOJ to
prosecute the high-ranking corporate individuals.24 Part III considers a
recent case where a Class III medical device manufacturer—along with its
top executives—was charged with violating the FDCA and the ensuing
controversial plea agreement.25 Part IV proposes an amendment to the
FDCA that abolishes or revises the strict-liability misdemeanor provision.
This will require prosecutors to prove criminal intent in the prosecution of
corporate defendants. Finally, I conclude by critiquing the current
prosecutorial policies and demonstrating how the revised FDCA and
proposed new policies will achieve more effective and fair results.
I.

INSIDE THE GOVERNING AGENCIES AND REGULATION
A. FEDERAL AGENCIES RESPONSIBLE FOR FDCA REGULATIONS
26
AND PROSECUTION

The FDA is responsible for protecting the public health and safety by
regulating industries that produce certain products, such as food, drugs, and
cosmetics.27 The agency investigates violations of the FDCA,28 which
23. United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658
(1975).
24. Todd S. Aagaard, A Fresh Look at the Responsible Relation Doctrine, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1245, 1246 (2006). “Responsible corporate office doctrine” is used
interchangeably with “responsible relation doctrine,” which is also commonly referred to as the
“Park doctrine.”
25. United States v. Guidant LLC, 708 F. Supp. 2d 903, 907–08 (D. Minn. 2010).
26. White-collar criminal defense and complex civil litigation attorneys Gurney, Shapiro and
Mays explain that
[m]ost criminal prosecutions [begin] with a visit from an FDA inspector, and charges
rarely [are] filed without a prosecution recommendation from the agency. Today, there
is a virtual constant stream of announcements of plea deals and multi-million dollar
settlements between prosecutors, led by U.S. Attorneys’ Offices and the Office of
Consumer Litigation, and pharmaceutical companies. These cases originate at DOJ, in
the U.S. Attorneys’ Offices, with civil qui tam complaints, and elsewhere; probably few
originate or are meaningfully steered by FDA. And it is not surprising that prosecutors
who know less about how the industry in fact operates take a more favorable view of a
provision that essentially puts the burden on executives to ensure perfect compliance
with the FDCA throughout their companies.
At the same time, it makes much less sense today than it did in 1938 to indulge the
fiction that executives—in pharmaceuticals or any other industry—can personally carry
this burden. We no longer live in a world of neighborhood druggists and family-owned
companies that directly supervise their own employees and operations. Modern-day
pharmaceutical executives “supervise” the work of sometimes hundreds of thousands of
employees and scores of corporate entities in dozens of countries.
Gurney, supra note 1, at F-22 (footnote omitted).
27. About FDA, supra note 3.
28. Legislation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation
/Legislation/default.htm (last updated May 4, 2011).
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regulates the manufacture and distribution of, inter alia, medical devices to
ensure efficacy and safety.29 Pursuant to the FDCA’s goals as a public
health law, FDCA violations are punishable by criminal penalties, as well
as civil sanctions.30
Within the FDA, the Office of Criminal Investigations (OCI)31 conducts
criminal investigations of companies and individuals suspected of violating
FDA regulations and “collect[s] evidence to support successful
prosecutions.”32 OCI agents gather information and evidence and refer the
case to the DOJ—specifically, to the U.S. Attorney’s Office in the
appropriate jurisdiction.33 As a constituent of the FDA, OCI plays an
integral part in the corporate investigation, providing U.S. Attorney’s
Offices, which typically lack expertise in these medical industries, with
expert information about sophisticated FDA-regulated products.34 While the
DOJ has the ultimate discretion to dismiss or prosecute alleged FDCA
violations,35 U.S. Attorney’s Offices secure guilty pleas or convictions in a
significant number of OCI referrals.36 Those companies and individuals
found guilty under the FDCA can expect to pay multi-million dollar fines

29. What does FDA do?, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA
/Transparency/Basics/ucm194877.htm (last updated Dec. 17, 2010) [hereinafter What does FDA
do?].
30. Carol Benjamin & Betsy J. Floman, Federal Food and Drug Act Violations, 31 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 629, 630 (1994); see also 21 U.S.C. § 333 (2006).
31. OCI was formed in 1992. From its beginning to 2009, OCI obtained 4,392 convictions that
resulted in the imposition of $9.89 billion in fines and restitution and forfeited assets worth over
$1 billion. Hamburg, supra note 5, at 1.
32. Inspections, Compliance, Enforcement, and Criminal Investigations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/CriminalInvestigations/ucm123027.htm (last updated May
29, 2009).
33. Lundquist & Conroy, supra note 8, at 21.
34. FDA Criminal Unit Guards Public Health, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Jan. 2011),
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm048718.pdf
[hereinafter FDA Criminal Unit Guards Public Health].
35. Lundquist & Conroy, supra note 8, at 21. (“Despite the fact that the decision to pursue
criminal prosecution is one of pure discretion, the presence of certain factors are predictive of
prosecution. . . . In addition, if the violation was intentional, easily detectable, preventable,
fraudulent, or life threatening, prosecution will be more likely. Violations which cause economic
injury are viewed no differently than violations which cause injury to the public health.”
(footnotes omitted)).
36. See FDA Criminal Unit Guards Public Health, supra note 34, at 2; FDA Law Enforcers
Protect Consumers’ Health Inside the Office of Criminal Investigations, FDA (Aug. 19, 2008,
8:18 PM), http://foodconsumer.org/7777/8888/L_aws_amp_Reg_64/081908182008_FDA_Law
_Enforcers_Protect_Consumers_Health_Inside_the_Office_of_Criminal_Investigations.shtml (“In
a typical year, FDA’s Special Agents will investigate about 1,000 criminal cases resulting in the
arrests of hundreds of suspected violators of public health laws. On average, 200 criminal suspects
are convicted each year as the result of OCI investigations. From 1993 to [2008], OCI has made
4,593 arrests that resulted in 3,546 convictions and more than $5.7 billion in fines and
restitutions.”).
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and are threatened with federal prison sentences.37 The FDA has been most
active in prosecuting medical device companies for FDCA violations.38
Earlier this year, the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
put the FDA’s “hand to the fire” for inadequate oversight of OCI.39 In a
scathing report, GAO found that the FDA “lacks performance measures that
could enhance its oversight of OCI by allowing it to assess OCI’s overall
success.”40 Notwithstanding its concession “that OCI’s impact on protecting
the public health cannot be measured solely by the number of arrests and
convictions,”41 GAO insisted on the FDA implementing an adequate review
process that would focus on accountability.42 Pursuant to this report, OCI
announced several changes to improve its effectiveness—the most
controversial of which is “increas[ing] the appropriate use of misdemeanor
prosecutions . . . to hold responsible corporate officials accountable.”43 In
addition, the office will “enhance its procedures to support the development
of debarment and disqualification actions.”44 OCI hopes these changes will
satisfy GAO’s mandates to crack down on corporate recidivism.45
Nevertheless, it seems as though OCI will be taking the blame out on
corporate executives for its own inadequacies.
B. THE FDCA
The FDCA was originally passed by Congress and signed into law in
1938.46 Replacing the ineffective 1906 Food and Drugs Act,47 the FDCA
was adopted in response to a public outcry that ensued following over 100
deaths caused by an adulterated pharmaceutical.48 The drug company
produced an untested “wonder drug” marketed for pediatric patients, which

37. FDA Criminal Unit Guards Public Health, supra note 34, at 1. “Criminal charges [against
individual defendants] will generally not be dismissed in return for a guilty plea by a corporate
defendant.” Benjamin & Floman, supra note 30, at 641.
38. Lundquist & Conroy, supra note 8, at 6. FDA also actively prosecutes FDCA violations in
areas of adulteration, misbranding, and clinical investigations. Id.
39. Shepard Mullin, FDA Looks to Boost Criminal Prosecutions, FDA LAW BLOG UPDATE
(Mar. 11, 2010, 6:44 AM), http://www.fdalawblog.com/2010/03/articles/legislation/fda-looks-toboost-criminal-prosecutions/; U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-221, FOOD AND
DRUG ADMINISTRATION: IMPROVED MONITORING AND DEVELOPMENT OF PERFORMANCE
MEASURES NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN OVERSIGHT OF CRIMINAL AND MISCONDUCT
INVESTIGATIONS 10 (2010), [hereinafter GAO REPORT], available at http://www.gao.gov/new
.items/d10221.pdf.
40. GAO REPORT, supra note 39, at 10.
41. Id. at 17.
42. Id. at 25.
43. Hamburg, supra note 5.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. FDA History-Part II, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA
/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm054826.htm (last updated June 6, 2009).
47. Id.
48. Id.

600

BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L.

[Vol. 6

unknowingly turned out to be highly toxic.49 This event propelled Congress
and President Roosevelt to enact a regulatory law to standardize and control
the production, approval processes, and labeling of drugs, medical devices,
food, and cosmetics.50 The FDCA has been amended several times over the
years, evolving into its current powerful and comprehensive form.51
Title 21 in the Code of Federal Regulations Parts 800 et seq.,52
promulgated by the FDA53 pursuant to the FDCA (21 U.S.C § 331 et
seq.),54 codifies specific rules and regulations applicable to certain entities,
such as medical device manufacturers.55 It sets forth guidelines ranging
from the classification of medical devices56 and pre- and post-market
approval requirements,57 including proper labeling and distribution
procedures58 to providing definitions of all relevant industry terms.59 The
FDA enforces these regulations to promote the safety and efficacy of
products’ intended uses.60
Of particular importance in this note are the criminal penalty terms set
forth in the FDCA.61 The misdemeanor provision (§ 333(a)(1)) provides
that “[a]ny person who violates a provision of section 331 of this title shall
be imprisoned for not more than one year or fined not more than $1,000, or
both.”62 Section 333(a)(2) stipulates,
Notwithstanding the [misdemeanor provisions], if any person commits
such a violation after a conviction of him under this section has become
final, or commits such a violation with the intent to defraud or mislead,

49. Id.
50. Id.; FDA History-Part IV, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov
/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm055137.htm (last updated June 18, 2009).
51. FDA History-Part III, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA
/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm055118.htm (last updated June 18, 2009).
52. Food and Drugs, 21 C.F.R. §§ 800–1299 (2010).
53. Code of Federal Regulations – Title 21 – Food and Drugs, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Databases/ucm135680.htm
(last updated June 19, 2009).
54. Federal Food, Drug, & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399(a) (2006).
55. See, e.g., Rules & Regulations, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov
/RegulatoryInformation/RulesRegulations/default.htm (last updated June 18, 2009).
56. Device Classification, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices
/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/Overview/ClassifyYourDevice/default.htm (last updated Apr. 27,
2009).
57. See, e.g., How to Market Your Device, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/HowtoMarketYourDevice
/default.htm (last updated Mar. 18, 2010) [hereinafter How to Market Your Device]; Postmarket
Requirements (Devices), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices
/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/PostmarketRequirements/default.htm (last updated Mar. 13,
2012).
58. How to Market Your Device, supra note 57.
59. Food and Drugs, 21 C.F.R. §§ 800–1299 (2010).
60. See, e.g., What does FDA do?, supra note 29.
61. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 333(a) (2006).
62. Id. § 333(a)(1).
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such person shall be imprisoned for not more than three years or fined not
more than $10,000, or both.63

A close examination of these two provisions highlights some serious
issues. First, the misdemeanor provision is a strict-liability offense,
requiring no proof of any knowledge with respect to the alleged violation.64
Second, while the felony provision requires proof of “intent to defraud or
mislead” under some circumstances, it can also be applied when an
individual is charged a second time under the misdemeanor provision.65 In
effect, an individual executive can be charged with a misdemeanor violation
under § 333(a)(1) and several years later be charged with a second
misdemeanor violation which would then constitute a felony according to
§ 333(a)(2).66 This could happen even if the individual executive is named
in criminal prosecutions under § 333(a) when working for different
companies several years apart.67 Although this will likely have a deterrent
effect, it is an excessive punishment to impose on these individuals.
Congress increased the maximum fines, requiring individuals to pay
$100,000 per count and $250,000 if a death occurred, and corporations to
pay $200,000 to $500,000 for each count charged.68 Additionally,
amendments made to the Sentencing Guidelines in 2008 resulted in an
increased likelihood of prison time for misdemeanor convictions under the
FDCA.69 These two changes “stacked the cards” in the government’s favor
even more, causing individuals charged with misdemeanor offenses to enter
into plea agreements, hoping to perhaps exchange a prison sentence for an
increased fine.70 Thus, corporate executives have no other choice but to
plead guilty and pay the ramped up fines to avoid a scarlet criminal record
and jail time.
II. JUSTICE SERVED OR JUSTICE DENIED?
A short primer on criminal law is necessary to fully understand why the
FDCA’s strict-liability penalty provision needs to be amended.

63. 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2) (2006).
64. Monograph, Office of Consumer Litigation, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov
/civil/docs_forms/OCPL_Monograph.pdf, 4 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012).
65. 21 U.S.C. § 333(a)(2).
66. Id.
67. See Gurney et al., supra note 1, F-17.
68. Melissa Gilmore & Brian K. Parker, FDA Sharpens Enforcement Teeth: Pre-Warning
Letter Executive Misdemeanor Charges Expected to Rise, MCGUIREWOODS (Apr. 27, 2010),
http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-resources/item.asp?item=4722.
69. Margolis et al., supra note 9, at 2.
70. FDA Announces New Push to Prosecute Corporate Officers and Executives for No-Intent
Crimes, SKADDEN, 3 (Mar. 5, 2010), http://www.skadden.com/Index.cfm?contentID=51
&itemID=2003 [hereinafter FDA Announces New Push] (noting that three Purdue Pharma
executives who were charged with violations of the FDCA and accepted a strict-liability
misdemeanor plea paid $34 million in criminal fines).
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A. A BACKGROUND ON CRIMINAL LAW
The principle purpose of criminal law is to prevent harm to society.71
Any criminal offense is considered to be more reprehensible than even the
most outrageous civil violation.72 Criminals are generally viewed as
menaces to society, who ought to be punished for their wrongdoing.73
Therefore, our American criminal justice system strives to discourage
certain conduct that does not fit within socially “normal” behavior.74
Because of this, criminal punishment is markedly different from civil
sanctions.75 Usually, regardless of how egregious a civil liability is, the
worst punishment will only be monetary.76 Criminal conduct, however, is
punished by both monetary sanctions and the threat of incarceration; in
some instances, the death penalty may even be imposed. The stigma behind
being accused and convicted of any crime is so offensive that even if it
results in a mere “slap on the wrist” and a fine, the devastation to the
individual’s integrity remains.77
Another important distinction between civil and criminal liability is that
the government is held to a higher burden of proof than parties in civil
cases. The prosecutor must prove every material element of the offense
beyond a reasonable doubt78 whereas the civil burden of proof is a mere
preponderance of the evidence.79 The legal principle—“it is better that ten
guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer”80—coined by English
jurist William Blackstone signifies the magnitude and importance of the
constitutional protection of a defendant’s individual liberties and freedom.

71. JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 1 (Matthew Bender & Company,
Inc, 5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW].
72. JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 3 (Thompson/West, 4th
ed. 2007) [hereinafter CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW].
73. Id. at 2.
74. Id. at 3.
75. UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 71, at 2.
76. See id. Criminal law is distinguished from civil by the “societal condemnation and stigma
that accompanies the conviction.” Id.
77. Corporate executives will suffer from the “personal and professional stain of simply being
charged with a crime in the first instance.” Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-17.
78. UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 71, at 68.
79. “Preponderance of the evidence” is defined as
[t]he greater weight of the evidence, not necessarily established by the greater number
of witnesses testifying to a fact but by evidence that has the most convincing force;
superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all
reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the
issue rather than the other. This is the burden of proof in most civil trials, in which the
jury is instructed to find for the party that, on the whole, has the stronger evidence,
however slight the edge may be.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 556 (5th pocket ed. 2004).
80. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *352.
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In general, a criminal act contains two components: the actus reus and
the mens rea.81 The actus reus (i.e., the prohibited act that causes a social
harm) is required for every crime.82 Typically, this is defined as an
affirmative action; however, albeit extremely uncommon, a person can be
prosecuted for failing to act, known as a criminal act of omission.83
Therefore, the actus reus is best understood as the prohibition of certain
conduct that causes a specific result by either action or inaction.84
Following this principle, one cannot be criminally charged with a “status
offense”—that is, simply possessing some state of being, such as
alcoholism, drug addiction, or homelessness.85 While every offense must
define a particular forbidden act,86 not all crimes require a culpable state of
mind.87
Despite being “deeply rooted in our legal tradition as one of our first
principles of law,”88 there is much debate as to the precise understanding of
what is the mens rea.89 In the general sense, mens rea connotes a “morally
blameworthy state of mind.”90 But the mens rea also has a more narrowly
tailored definition, which is specifically associated with each actus reus
defined in the offense.91 Scholars call this the “elemental” definition of
mens rea.92 There are four levels of culpability: purpose, knowledge,
recklessness, and negligence.93 The most serious offenses, which carry the
greatest penalties, require the prosecutor to prove the defendant committed
the act purposely or knowingly. In some instances, however, penal codes
assign lower levels of mental culpability (e.g., recklessness or criminal
negligence) to serious offenses where it is far too difficult to prove the
defendant’s mental state, or where the act is considered so reprehensible or
affects a large number of people that the legislature does not require proof
of any mens rea.94 In other words, it does not matter that the defendant did
or did not intend to commit the offensive act; the fact that he committed the
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 71, at 85.
Id.
Id. at 105.
Id. at 85, 105.
Id. at 96–100.
Id. at 87.
Id. at 145.
United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 489 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), discussed in
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 72, at 147.
89. CASE AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 72, at 148 (“I have always thought
that most of the difficulties as to the mens rea was due to having no precise understanding what
the mens rea is.”) (quoting 1 Holmes-Laski Letters 4 (M. Wolfe, ed. 1953) (letter of July 14,
1916) (Oliver Wendell Holmes).
90. CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 72, at 148.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. AM. LAW INST., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.02 cmt. (Official Draft
and Explanatory Notes 1985).
94. See generally UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 71, at 145–51.
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act is enough to convict. These are called strict-liability offenses.95 Yet,
these types of offenses are rare exceptions to the rule. Strict liability is most
often applied in the “public welfare” context, where penalties for violations
are usually minor, such as a small monetary fine or a very short jail
sentence.96
There is a strong presumption against strict liability.97 According to the
canons of statutory interpretation, when there is no mens rea written in the
statute of a certain offense, it is assumed that at least criminal negligence is
attached and must be proven.98
In summary, crimes generally consist of the actus reus and mens rea.99
The actus reus is usually a voluntary act,100 but in rare instances can also be
a criminal act of omission.101 While strict-liability offenses may consist of
just actus reus,102 the defendant can never be accused of just a culpable
state of mind.103 These principles are graphically summarized below and
illustrate how the FDCA’s misdemeanor provision does not fall within any
category of criminal offenses. Therefore, it belongs outside the ambit of
criminal law, unless an amendment is made to include some level of mental
culpability that will rectify its current misinterpretation and application. The
following chart provides a comparison of the elements of the rape and
homicide statutes to the FDCA’s misdemeanor provision.
Comparison of Elements in Common Crimes to the FDCA’s Misdemeanor
Provision
Mens rea (purposely,
Actus reus (voluntary act or legal
knowingly, recklessly, or omission causing social harm)
negligently)
No crime
Rape (MPC §
213.1)

No mens rea
No mens rea (strict
liability)

No act
Engages in sexual intercourse with
a female by means of force, threats
of bodily injury, or intoxicants or
while the female is unconscious or
less than ten years old.

95. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 427 (3rd pocket ed. 2006) (defining “strict liability”
as “liability that does not depend on actual negligence or intent to harm, but that is based on the
breach of an absolute duty to make something safe”).
96. UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 71, at 147.
97. Id. at 146.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 85.
100. Id. at 87.
101. Id. at 105.
102. Id. at 145.
103. Id. at 86–87.
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Comparison of Elements in Common Crimes to the FDCA’s Misdemeanor
Provision
Mens rea (purposely,
Actus reus (voluntary act or legal
knowingly, recklessly, or omission causing social harm)
negligently)
Negligent
Homicide
(MPC § 210.4)
Manslaughter
(MPC § 210.3)
Murder
(MPC § 210.2)

Negligently

Causes the death of another human
being

Recklessly

Causes the death of another human
being
Causes the death of another human
being

The FDCA’s
Misdemeanor
Provision
(21 U.S.C.
§ 333(a))

No mens rea (strict
liability)

Purposely or knowingly

No act—executives “held
accountable for criminal misdeeds
simply by virtue of their
position”104 (i.e., criminal
omission)

While a strict-liability offense may be appropriate in the context of
FDCA violations because it is a public welfare offense, the misdemeanor
provision of the FDCA has not only been interpreted as strict liability, but
also criminalizes an act of omission.105 Nothing could be more contrary to
the fundamental principles of American criminal law.106 It combines the
rarest form of actus reus with the rare strict-liability principle to form a
highly controversial and unfair criminal offense. High-ranking executives
of health care companies can be charged based on either their status in the
corporate hierarchy, or their failure to act, and without wrongful intent or
knowledge of any criminal conduct.107 It could not reasonably have been
Congress’ intent to impose criminal penalties for merely possessing a
certain position or status in one’s place of employment. Nor could it
reasonably have been Congress’ intent to criminalize an executive’s failure
to monitor each employee’s conduct without having to prove any intent in
his failure to act. As discussed above, canons of statutory interpretation
require that any criminal offense that does not expressly include a mental
104. Mark Carlisle Levy & Gregory G. Schwab, The Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine—
The Doctrine no Longer Sleeps for Drug and Device Companies, SAUL EWING UPDATE, 7
(July/Aug. 2010), http://www.saul.com/media/article/1018_PDF_2736.pdf.
105. See Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-10; Aagaard, supra note 24, at 1274–85 (discussing
criminal omissions and finding that the responsible relation doctrine is a form of criminal
omission, which “raises more questions than it answers” because “even morally reprehensible
omissions, are not punished as crimes”).
106. UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 71, at 85.
107. Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-9.
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culpability deemed by default must impose at least criminal negligence.
Therefore, the FDCA’s misdemeanor provision should only be interpreted
as an executive’s negligent or reckless failure to monitor employees whose
conduct has caused a harm.
It is also important to note that it has long been standard prosecutorial
policy not to charge individuals with misdemeanor violations of the FDCA
specifically because it was unfair to make a criminal out of an individual
executive without proving any knowledge of the wrongdoing.108 Instead,
individual executives would only be prosecuted under the felony provision
when there was clear intent involved.109
B. THE RESPONSIBLE CORPORATE OFFICER DOCTRINE
In 1943, the Supreme Court authorized no-intent misdemeanor
prosecutions in Dotterweich v. United States,110 and again in 1975 in United
States v. Park.111 Both cases involved violations of § 333(a)(1) of the
FDCA by FDA-regulated companies and resulted in convictions of the
accused high-ranking corporate executives.112 The defendant in
Dotterweich, who was the president and general manager of a
pharmaceutical company, was charged and convicted for three counts of
pharmaceutical misbranding
based on a single order from a single physician. One drug in the shipment
included an ingredient that had been removed from the official formula
listed on the “National Formulary.” Another was less potent than required
by the government and than indicated on the label. Dotterweich had no
personal connection to the particular shipment for which he was charged;
his only connection was that he was “in general charge of the
corporation’s business and had given general instructions to its employees
to fill orders received from physicians.” He was convicted, while the
113
corporation was acquitted.

The rationale behind the court’s conclusion to “dispense[] with the
conventional requirement for criminal conduct—awareness of some
wrongdoing” was based on the “interest of the larger good [to put] the
burden of acting at hazard upon a person otherwise innocent but standing in
responsible relation to a public danger.”114

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

When Heart Devices Fail, supra note 1, at 4.
Id.
See generally United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943).
See generally United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975).
See generally Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277; Park, 421 U.S. 658.
Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-10 (quoting United States v. Buffalo Pharmacal Co., 131
F.2d 500, 501 (2d Cir. 1942), rev’d sub nom., United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 278
(1943)).
114. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 281.
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Over thirty years later, the Court returned to this issue and clarified
Dotterweich’s responsible relation doctrine in Park.115 In Park, the
president of a large national food store chain was charged and convicted
with five counts of violating the FDCA for causing the adulteration of food
due to rat infestations in the company’s warehouses.116 Park was fully
aware that the system to ensure sanitary conditions was inadequate, and
although he was responsible for ensuring that sanitation measures were
sufficient, he failed to implement a more effective system.117
Notwithstanding his awareness of the violations, Park, like Dotterweich,
was convicted based on his status as a “supervisor[] or manager[] who
st[ood] in ‘responsible relation’ to the violation by virtue of [his] authority
and responsibility.”118
The responsible relation doctrine is faulty because in neither of the
seminal cases does the Supreme Court’s rationale “clearly explain from
what authority the doctrine is derived [and] how the doctrine relates to the
elements of the offense.”119 Scholars have attempted to justify the doctrine
based on the need to encourage corporate executives to avoid conduct that
threatens the public health and safety, despite the recognition that this will
be a “potentially onerous . . . obligation” to impose on these individuals.120
This deterrence explanation overlooks the fact that almost every criminal
offense poses an equally grave threat to public health and welfare121 (e.g.,
homicide statutes). Furthermore, criminal law generally does not set out to
prohibit acts of omission and hold individuals liable for failing to prevent
certain conduct or unwanted results from occurring.122

115.
116.
117.
118.

Park, 421 U.S. 658.
Id.
Id. at 664–65.
Aagaard, supra note 24, at 1251. The FDCA has been interpreted to extend “to all those
having such ‘a responsible share in the furtherance of the transaction which the statute outlaws.’”
Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-10 (quoting Dotterweich, 320 U.S. at 284).
119. Aagaard, supra note 24, at 1251. See also the Fourth Circuit’s analysis in Park, finding
that
[t]he Government argues that the conviction may be predicated solely upon a showing
that the defendant, Park, was the President of the offending corporation. The error here
is that the Government has confused the element of ‘awareness of wrongdoing’ with the
element of ‘wrongful action’; Dotterweich dispenses with the need to prove the first of
those elements but not the second.
United States v. Park, 499 F.2d 839, 841 (4th Cir. 1974) (citation omitted).
120. Aagaard, supra note 24, at 1246.
121. See CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 72, at 2 (quoting George K.
Gardner, Bailey v. Richardson and the Constitution of the United States, 33 B.U. L. REV. 176, 196
(1953)) (“What distinguishes a criminal from a civil sanction and all that distinguishes it, it is
ventured, is the judgment of community condemnation which accompanies and justifies its
imposition. . . . ‘It is the expression of the community’s hatred, fear, or contempt for the convict
which alone characterizes physical hardship as punishment.’”).
122. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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Some argue that although American law disfavors making a failure to
act a criminal offense,123 the responsible relation doctrine is a form of
criminal omission124 that “substitutes a breach of a duty to act for the
conventional act requirement.”125 Nonetheless, the FDCA does not
delineate a wrongful act at all, but rather causes a ‘responsible officer’ to be
guilty merely by his status126 in the corporate hierarchy.127 This raises
serious constitutional issues as it violates an individual’s due process
rights.128
123. Aagaard, supra note 24, at 1275.
124. Id. at 1274. The author clarifies this point in noting that “the defendant is liable for his
failure to act to prevent or correct a violation, rather than for affirmative misconduct.” Id.
125. Id. at 1269.; To further this point, a well-known law firm explained that
[c]ommission of the crime requires only an act. The act need not have been intentional
or reckless, or even negligent. It is irrelevant what the defendant knew or should have
known. If a drug is misbranded or adulterated, or if a misbranded or adulterated drug is
distributed . . . someone . . . has committed a crime.
Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-10.
126. An expert on directors’ and officers’ liability insurance issues discusses in his blog:
[T]he idea that liability can be imposed on an individual for corporate misconduct, in
apparent disregard of the corporate form and without culpable involvement or even a
requirement of a culpable state of mind, seems inconsistent with the most basic
concepts surrounding the corporate form. The doctrine arguably imposes liability for
nothing more than a person’s status. The word “responsible” in the doctrine’s name
does not mean that the individual is responsible for the misconduct, but on that that the
individual is responsible for the corporation.
Kevin LaCroix, More About the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, D&O DIARY (Mar. 8,
2010, 4:24 AM), http://www.dandodiary.com/2010/03/articles/corporate-governance/more-about
-the-responsible-corporate-officer-doctrine/print.html (emphasis in original).
127. This point is discussed in WilmerHale’s publication, stating that
[e]ven more remarkable is that for certain classes of people, even a bad act is
unnecessary to secure a criminal conviction under the FDCA. In particular, the
executives and managers of the companies that make, distribute, and sell
pharmaceuticals can be convicted for violating the FDCA without having personally
participated in the act being punished or having been an accessory to it. For these
persons, it is enough to secure a conviction that (a) a prohibited act took place
somewhere within the company, and (b) the defendant’s position within the company
was one that gave him or her responsibility and authority either to prevent the violation
or to correct it. In other words, the crime is being in the wrong position at the wrong
time. It is not just strict liability; it is strict, vicarious liability.
Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-10 (emphasis in original).
128. Aagaard, supra note 24, at 1269. In deciding United States v. Park, the Fourth Circuit
stated:
It is argued by the prosecution that the requirement of such proof will make
enforcement more difficult. Nevertheless, the requirements of due process are intended
to favor fairness and justice over ease of enforcement. We perceive nothing harsh about
requiring proof of personal wrongdoing before sanctioning the imposition of criminal
penalties.
United States v. Park, 499 F.2d 839, 842 (4th Cir. 1974).
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Another attempt to justify the “omission” rationale is the idea that
“responsible” corporate officers “[assume] a contractual obligation to
protect the general public from certain hazards.”129 This argument also
quickly loses force because basic contract, business association, and agency
law all dictate that in this context the officer has established a relationship
with the corporation, not the public.130 For example, an officer’s violation
of the FDCA would make the medical device company, not the officer,
liable to the public based on the doctrine of respondeat superior.131
The responsible corporate officer doctrine is not only applicable to
high-ranking officers.132 Thus, it should be used to prosecute lower-level
managers and employees who have direct responsibility for the conduct that
caused an FDCA violation. Any employee holding a position of authority
and responsibility who is accountable for even the smallest aspect of the
corporate operations should be held criminally liable under this doctrine,
not just the CEO or other figurehead executive.133 To further illustrate this
point, imagine Acme, Inc., a medical device manufacturing company of
heart defibrillators that has numerous worldwide corporate affiliations
assisting with the production of its medical devices. One such affiliation is
with a foreign manufacturer that produces a component of the heart device,
which is incorporated into Acme’s product. Suppose Smith, a lower-level
manager of that foreign corporation, fails to monitor the employees for
whom he is directly responsible, and a manufacturing error results, causing
some of the devices to malfunction. Several years later, perhaps even after
Smith has left the corporation, the manufacturing error is discovered when
patients are harmed as a result of the malfunction in Acme’s medical
device. Who is to blame? According to the responsible corporate officer
doctrine, all of Acme’s managers and executives who stand in ‘responsible
relation’ to the manufacturing error could be held liable. But this is not how
the responsible corporate officer doctrine is currently being used with the
FDCA. It would make more sense if Smith were held liable since he was
directly responsible for the error and should have at least informed his
manager of it. In fact, this would be the only rational way to remedy and
prevent similar errors from occurring in the future. Punishing only the
highest-ranking corporate officer will do nothing to deter lower-level
managers from committing similar violations in the future since they are not
being held accountable. Some argue that the high-ranking corporate
official’s job responsibility is to oversee all corporate operations and ensure
129. Aagaard, supra note 24, at 1281.
130. Id. at 1282. The Fourth Circuit explains: “It is the defendant’s relation to the criminal acts,
not merely his relation to the corporation, which the jury must consider; 21 U.S.C. § 331 is
concerned with criminal conduct and not proprietary relationships.” Park, 499 F.2d at 841.
131. See Ved P. Nanda, Corporate Criminal Liability in the United States: Is a New Approach
Warranted?, 58 AM. J. CORP. L. 605, 607 (2010).
132. Aagaard, supra note 24, at 1286.
133. Id.
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that the medical device company does not violate the FDCA and any other
applicable laws.134 Yet, it is irrational to believe that one individual can
monitor and know everything about every aspect of the corporation and its
affiliate corporations, especially since medical device manufacturers
employ thousands of people and have operations spanning across the
country and even around the globe.135
Another important implication arising from prosecutions based on the
responsible corporate officer doctrine is the difficulty, if not impossibility,
of individual officers to successfully plead not guilty when the company
chooses to plead guilty.136 Basic principles of business associations and
agency law define a corporation as an entity that can only act through its
agents (i.e., individual employees). Considering this, it would be difficult
for a jury to reconcile finding the officer not guilty when the corporation
pled guilty to the same FDCA violation. This is further complicated by the
fact that plea agreements made with the corporation typically require full
disclosure of company information to assist with the prosecution of the
individual executive(s). The executive is essentially stripped of his
constitutional rights because he is left with no other choice than to plead
guilty and face the harsh criminal penalties imposed by the FDCA. With
everything “stacked in favor” of the government, he does not have a fair
chance at trial. Even if the individual decides to plead not guilty to charges
brought based on his status as a “responsible corporate officer,” there are
very few defenses available.137 Furthermore, the available defenses are
134. Id. at 1282.
135. Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-22.
136. FDA-regulated companies will often find it more cost effective and beneficial for the longterm survival of the company to plead guilty. FDA guidelines and DOJ manuals indicate that they
will be more lenient on companies that plead guilty and cooperate with the FDA investigation and
prosecution. Cooperation often involves the company assisting the government with the
prosecution of the high-ranking corporate officials, who have also been charged with the FDCA
violation(s). These corporations are threatened with the possibility of being barred from having
future products obtain FDA-approval, which would undoubtedly negatively impact the
corporations’ prosperity. Clearly, so as to not breach their fiduciary duty, the boards of directors
will choose to cooperate with the government, regardless of how this will affect the individuals
who are charged. It should also be recognized that no matter how comprehensive a corporation’s
compliance program is, other errors or violations may exist at any given time. Therefore, it is in
the company’s best interest to plead guilty because upon investigation, the government may find
other violations, and for failing to enter into a plea agreement to the alleged charges, the
government could then aggressively prosecute the company for these other violations. The
company is cornered just as much as the individual corporate executives are in these situations.
See generally Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways to Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1359, 1380–82 (2009); see also Nanda, supra note 131, at 613–14.
137. Lundquist & Conroy, supra note 8, at 24–25. One expert outlined the following defenses
to FDCA violation allegations:
[C]riminal estoppel is based on the notion that when those responsible for enforcing the
law are aware of the allegedly violative behavior, yet explicitly or implicitly condone or
ignore it, justice would dictate that those same officials not be allowed to later punish
that behavior.
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“amorphous and ambiguous,” which raises serious fairness issues about the
doctrine’s use.138 Being charged automatically imputes guilt.139
III. UNITED STATES V. GUIDANT
A. MAJOR MEDICAL DEVICE MANUFACTURER CHARGED WITH
VIOLATIONS OF THE FDCA
On February 25, 2010, Guidant, LLC, a medical device manufacturer,
and its top executives, were charged with criminal violations of the FDCA
related to safety problems with some of the company’s implantable
cardioverter defibrillators (ICDs).140 After a four-year investigation, a
criminal information was filed in the District Court for the District of
Minnesota alleging that Guidant and its executives concealed information
regarding catastrophic failures of some of the company’s ICDs.141

. . . The defendant must show that he relied on the misinformation and that
reliance was reasonable.
....
Substantive defenses, of course, may be asserted in prosecutions under the FDCA.
Some of these defenses may center on such issues as whether the food was, indeed,
adulterated, whether the drug was mislabeled, or whether false statements were actually
made.
....
Impossibility was recognized as a defense to FDCA violations in United States v.
Park . . . . [The impossibility defense] “is raised when defendant introduces sufficient
evidence of the exercise of extraordinary care to justify placing an additional burden on
the government — that of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that had defendant indeed
exercised such extraordinary care, he could have prevented or corrected these
violations.”
Id. (emphasis in original) (citing 421 U.S. 658 (1975); United States v. Gel Spice Co., 601 F.
Supp. 1205, 1213 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)).
138. Michael W. Peregrine & Joshua T. Buchman, Alerting the ‘C-Suite;’ The Responsible
Corporate Officer Doctrine, AM. HEALTH LAW. ASS’N 2 (Feb. 2010), available at http://www
.mwe.com/info/pubs/AHLA_0210.pdf.
139. See generally Gurney et al., supra note 1.
140. United States v. Guidant LLC, 708 F. Supp. 2d. 903, 907 (D. Minn. 2010). ICDs are Class
III
lifesaving devices used to detect and treat abnormal heart rhythms that can result in
sudden cardiac death . . . . The devices, once surgically implanted, constantly monitor
the electrical activity in a patient’s heart for deadly electrical rhythms and deliver an
electrical shock to the heart in an effort to return the heartbeat to normal. If they fail to
operate properly when needed, a person can die within minutes.
Defibrillator Maker Pleads Guilty; Penalty to Exceed $296 Million, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH &
SAFETY (Apr. 7, 2010) [hereinafter Defibrillator Maker Pleads Guilty], available at http://
ohsonline.com/articles/2010/04/07/defib-maker-pleads-guilty.aspx.
141. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice Office of Pub. Affairs, Medical Device Manufacturer
Guidant Charged in Failure to Report Defibrillator Safety Problems to FDA (Feb. 25, 2010)
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In 2002, Guidant became aware that one of its ICDs was prone to
failure, rendering the device inoperative and unable to deliver lifesaving
therapy.142 Guidant, however, neglected to alert the FDA of this
information143 as required by the applicable regulation.144 Guidant
subsequently changed the design to correct the problem,145 but falsely
submitted a “Product Update” to the FDA, stating that the changes did not
affect the device’s safety or efficacy.146 Yet, the design changes were
specifically made to correct this flaw.147 In 2004, Guidant discovered a
similar problem with two more of its ICDs.148 During that year, a twentyone-year-old college student with one of Guidant’s malfunctioning ICDs
[hereinafter Press Release], available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2010/February/10-civ
-202.html.
142. Id.
143. Defibrillator Maker Pleads Guilty, supra note 140.
144. 21 C.F.R. § 803.50(a) (2010) (“If you are a manufacturer, you must report to us no later
than 30 calendar days after the day that you receive or otherwise become aware of information,
from any source, that reasonably suggests that a device that you market: (1) May have caused or
contributed to a death or serious injury; or (2) Has malfunctioned and this device or a similar
device that you market would be likely to cause or contribute to a death or serious injury, if the
malfunction were to recur.”); Id. § 803.53 (“You must submit a 5-day report to us . . . no later than
5 work days after the day that you become aware that: (a) An MDR reportable event necessitates
remedial action to prevent an unreasonable risk of substantial harm to the public health. You may
become aware of the need for remedial action from any information, including any trend analysis;
or (b) We have made a written request for the submission of a 5-day report. If you receive such a
written request from us, you must submit, without further requests, a 5-day report for all
subsequent events of the same nature that involve substantially similar devices for the time period
specified in the written request. We may extend the time period stated in the ordinal written
request if we determine it is in the interest of the public health.”); Id. § 803.3 (defining a MDR
reportable event as “[a]n event that manufacturers . . . become aware of that reasonably suggests
that one of their marketed devices: (i) May have caused or contributed to a death or serious injury,
or (ii) Has malfunctioned and that the device or a similar device marketed by the manufacturer . . .
would be likely to cause or contribute to a death or serious injury if the malfunction were to
recur”).
145. Thomas M. Burton & Anna Wilde Matthews, Guidant Sold Heart Device After
Discovering Flaw, WALL ST. J., June 2, 2005, at D3.
146. Press Release, supra note 141.
(a) Each device manufacturer . . . shall submit a written report to FDA of any correction
or removal of a device initiated by such manufacturer . . . if the correction or removal
was initiated:
(1) To reduce a risk to health posed by the device; or
(2) To remedy a violation of the act caused by the device which may present a risk
to health . . . .
(b) The manufacturer . . . shall submit any report required by paragraph (a) of this
section within 10-working days of initiating such correction or removal
21 C.F.R. § 806.10 (emphasis added). Section 806.1(b) outlines the several actions that are
exempt from the reporting requirements, including “[a]ctions taken by device manufacturers . . . to
improve the performance or quality of a device but that do not reduce a risk to health posed by the
device or remedy a violation of the act caused by the device.” Id. § 806.1(b).
147. Press Release, supra note 141.
148. Id.
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died when the device short-circuited and failed to shock his heart back into
rhythm.149 The patient’s doctors notified Guidant of this event, but the
company decided not to inform the FDA.150 Guidant sent a “Product
Update” communication to physicians, which instructed caretakers on how
to monitor the device to avoid potential risks posed by the shortcircuiting.151 Despite this, Guidant neglected to alert the FDA about this
action within the required ten days.152 At least seven individuals with
Guidant ICDs died as a result of the malfunctioning device.153 Guidant
executives contended that they complied with FDA regulations by reporting
the “manufacturing enhancements” of the ICDs in their 2003 annual
report.154 According to Guidant, the changes made to the ICDs were so
minor that they did not fall under the reportable medical device changes
category,155 as required under 21 C.F.R. § 806.10. In defense of the other
charge—that they failed to notify the FDA of their awareness that a patient
had suffered a serious bodily injury or death as a result of their
malfunctioning medical device, as required under 21 C.F.R. § 803.53—
Guidant argued that it did not believe it would be wise to startle the public
and cause patients to undergo risky surgical removal of the device because
it considered the occurrence of the malfunctioning to be statistically
insignificant.156 There were over 37,000 implanted devices157 and only
twenty-six known adverse events.158 The figurehead Guidant executives,
who were charged with the FDCA violations, may or may not have known
about the defect, but perhaps other lower-level executives responsible for
the engineering operations of the ICDs did know.159 The government did
not conduct a focused investigation of the operations to uncover the direct
culprit.160 Under the strict-liability misdemeanor penalty in the FDCA, it
does not matter what the charged official knew or did not know.161 Using
figureheads as scapegoats and not holding the person(s) directly responsible

149. Barry Meier, Heart Device Sold Despite Flaw, Data Shows, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2005, at
C.1 [hereinafter Heart Devices Sold Despite Flaw].
150. See Press Release, supra note 141.
151. See id.
152. CPB Open Cases: U.S. v. Guidant LLC, OFFICE OF CONSUMER LITIGATION, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUSTICE (Apr. 27, 2010), available at www.justice.gov/civil/cpb/cases/cases/guidant/index
.html.
153. Barry Meier, More Deaths Are Linked to Device, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2005, at C.1.
154. Heart Device Sold Despite Flaw, Data Shows, supra note 149.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Burton & Matthews, supra note 145.
158. Id.
159. Barry Meier, Files Show Guidant Foresaw Some Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at C.1.
160. Guidant and its executives quickly entered into a plea agreement upon being charged with
violations of the FDCA. United States v. Guidant LLC, 708 F. Supp. 2d 903, 907–08 (D. Minn.
2010).
161. Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-10.
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for the error liable ensures that these types of occurrences are likely to
happen again.
B. CONTROVERSIAL PLEA AGREEMENT
Guidant and its executives were charged with two counts of violations
of the FDCA for submitting a false and misleading report to the FDA
regarding changes made to two of the company’s ICDs.162 On April 5,
2010, Guidant pled guilty to the two misdemeanor charges pursuant to 21
U.S.C. § 333(a)(1).163 After entering into negotiations with the government,
the plea agreement was submitted to Judge Donavan W. Frank of the U.S.
District Court for the District of Minnesota for approval.164 The plea
consisted of dropping the criminal charges against the individual executives
and requiring Guidant to pay a criminal fine of $253,962,251 and
$42,079,675 in criminal forfeiture fees, which only amounted to a 1 percent
fine to the company.165 Judge Frank rejected the parties’ plea agreement,
finding it not to be “in the best interests of justice and . . . not [to] serve the
public’s interests because [it does] not adequately address Guidant’s history
and the criminal conduct at issue.”166 This decision came after Drs. Hauser
and Maron—the treating physicians of the twenty-one-year-old who died as
a result of the defective device—wrote Judge Frank, urging him to reject
the plea agreement.167 The physicians considered the agreement
unsatisfactory, as the government agreed not to prosecute the company and
the individuals whose “egregious act[s]” caused patients to “die[] or suffer[]
pain and mental anguish as the direct result of Guidant’s illegal and
unethical behavior.”168 As noted in the decision rejecting the agreement, the
judge urged the parties to incorporate probation provisions and resubmit the
plea.169

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Guidant LLC, 708 F. Supp. 2d at 905.
Id. at 915.
Id. at 921.
Id. at 908.
Id. at 915.
Letter from Robert G. Hauser, M.D. & Barry J. Maron, M.D. to The Honorable Donavan
W. Frank (Apr. 12, 2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter Letter to Judge Frank].
168. Id.
169. Guidant LLC, 708 F. Supp. 2d at 918–22. The Court did not require the parties to include
restitution, stating that,
For the reasons set forth below, the Court concludes that [the parties have] a right to
order restitution . . . but that there are no victims directly and proximately harmed by
Guidant’s criminal conduct as it relates to the crimes to which Guidant has pled guilty
to and to the underlying circumstances related to those crimes as admitted by Guidant.
Id. at 906.
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IV. TIME FOR CHANGE—PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO FDCA
A. INCORPORATING A MENS REA ELEMENT INTO THE
MISDEMEANOR PENALTY
The Supreme Court has interpreted § 333(a), the criminal penalty
provisions of the FDCA, as holding corporations and/or individuals who
violate any provision of § 331 of the Act liable without proof of criminal
intent (i.e., strict liability).170 In light of the recent interest in prosecuting
FDCA violations made by health care industry corporations and their top
executives, supported by the Court’s controversial decisions,171 § 333(a)(1),
the misdemeanor provision, should be rewritten to include a mens rea
requirement of at least criminal negligence or reckless conduct. Subsections
333(a) and (b) of the FDCA set forth misdemeanor and felony penalties for
acts in violation of Title 21 of the Federal Code of Regulations—Food and
Drugs.172 As it stands, these ambiguously written criminal provisions and
their interpretations strip individuals of their constitutional due process
rights and run afoul of fundamental corporate law principles, as well as
accepted canons of statutory interpretation. Authorizing federal prosecutors
to go on a tirade against health care company executives with these vague
and unfair criminal statutes has the unsettling potential to make criminals
out of law-abiding businesspeople.173 Congressional action will not only
protect the innocent in the corporate world, but will also prevent future
adverse effects on patients from adulterated medical devices, and achieve
the FDA’s ultimate goal of securing public health and safety.174
Congress is currently debating whether to criminalize product liability
tort law to ensure corporate accountability.175 A Senate Judiciary Hearing
was held on March 10, 2010, where several experts in the productmanufacturing and defective product liability law fields were questioned
regarding this controversial step.176 One expert in tort law, Mr. Victor E.
Schwartz, testified at the hearing and raised the hotly contested issue over
the current excessive punitive damage awards imposed on manufacturers.177
Some experts take the stance that these high punitive penalties are

170. Kevin LaCroix, More About the Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine, D&O DIARY
(Mar. 8, 2010, 4:24 AM), http://www.dandodiary.com/2010/03/articles/corporate-governance
/more-about-the-responsible-corporate-officer-doctrine/print.html.
171. See FDA Announces New Push, supra note 70 (examining the government’s new push to
prosecute pharmaceutical and medical device executives under the FDCA and the responsible
corporate officer doctrine, and its recent impact on health care companies and executives).
172. Food and Drugs, 21 C.F.R. §§ 800–1299 (2010); 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2006).
173. Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-13.
174. What does FDA do?, supra note 29.
175. Defective Products: Will Criminal Penalties Ensure Corporate Accountability?: Hearing
Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 14–15 (statement of Victor E. Schwartz, Shook, Hardy, and Bacon LLP).
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necessary to encourage manufacturers to be more vigilant in their product
safety.178 It has been argued, however, that even these excessive punitive
damage awards are not achieving their intended deterrent effect and,
therefore, criminal penalties must be added.179 Mr. Schwartz warns the
committee,
[P]unitive damages have run wild in this country and people don’t know
when they are going to be punished or how they are going to be punished
or where. It is over-heated at this point, and that is why constitutional
constraints have been put on punitive damages. It is really not a wise thing
right now to add yet another vague alternative and make it criminal.
....
In a nutshell, . . . [w]e don’t want manufacturers to be killing people,
but to put a crime based on the topic of defect [which is a vaguely defined
term in tort law] is putting a crime based on a fog.180

This debate over criminalizing tort product liability is highly relevant to
the controversial misdemeanor provisions under the FDCA. Experts worry
that imposing criminal sanctions based on vague tort law concepts will have
a “chilling effect on law-abiding companies.”181 In the same vein,
prosecuting corporate executives under the FDCA’s misdemeanor provision
without proof of criminal intent or any knowledge with respect to the
violation will have a similar chilling effect.
There are several reasons why the misdemeanor provision must be
amended. First, the Supreme Court’s two controversial decisions on the
interpretation of the misdemeanor provision are outdated and, thus, must be
revisited.182 The health care manufacturing industry, and corporations in
general, have expanded and changed significantly since those decisions
were passed down.183 In 1943, when Dotterweich was decided,
pharmaceutical companies were more akin to “mom-and-pop” apothecaries
than to today’s complex, multi-faceted international manufacturing
corporations, such as Guidant, LLC and Johnson & Johnson, Inc. At the
time of Dotterweich, executives were capable of directly overseeing all dayto-day activities and could reasonably be held liable under a “knew or
should have known” standard. Today, it is virtually impossible for highranking individuals to be aware of every manufacturing operation in the
corporation. Some may argue that executives who sign their employment

178. See id. at 15–17 (statement of Donald L. Mays, Senior Dir., Product Safety and Consumer
Sciences, Consumers Union, Yonkers, N.Y.).
179. See, e.g., id. at 6.
180. Id. at 14–15 (statement of Victor E. Schwartz, Shook, Hardy, and Bacon LLP).
181. Id. at 6 (statement of Barry J. Maron, M.D., Director, Hypertrophic Cardiomyopathy
Center, Minneapolis Heart Institute Foundation).
182. Margolis et al., supra note 9, at 6.
183. See Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-22.
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contracts assume the responsibility of ensuring the corporation complies
with every aspect of not only the FDCA but all other applicable laws and
regulations as well. This, however, is a naïve assumption and an impossible
onus to impose on executives in this day and age, with thousands of
employees directly and indirectly associated with corporations that make
hundreds of thousands of products.
Today’s complex corporate structure must be considered when
amending the FDCA’s misdemeanor provision. There are numerous officers
and managers holding positions of authority in the corporate hierarchy;
therefore, it is necessary to revise the policy under the responsible corporate
officer doctrine, which currently endorses the prosecution of all highranking officials who might have some remote responsibility, regardless of
their involvement in the FDCA violation. Instead, prosecutorial policies
should not center on using the figurehead executives as scapegoats, but
rather should focus on conducting investigations that uncover the direct
managerial culprit, as well as the individual employees who were aware of
the conduct that caused the FDCA violation and failed to report it.
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 333(a) as a strict-liability
criminal provision is highly controversial.184 According to the fundamental
principles of criminal law, “[p]ublic-welfare offenses are the most common
examples of . . . strict-liability offenses. . . . [H]owever, a statute that is
silent regarding mens rea may, nonetheless, be interpreted as requiring at
least some minimal level of mens rea.”185 “[I]f the penalty is light,
involving a relatively small fine and not including imprisonment, then mens
rea probably is not required.”186 Since FDCA violations do carry substantial
fines and imprisonment sentences, it is highly unlikely that Congress
intended for this to be one of the rare federal strict-liability offenses. In fact,
there is no suggestion that this was Congress’ intention. Constitutional due
process rights also support the argument against a strict-liability
interpretation. Federal prosecutors are permitted to impose imprisonment
penalties on corporate executives without proving that they had any
involvement in the FDCA violation. Once slapped with a criminal
indictment, high-ranking executives are left with no other option than to
plead guilty and pay the consequences for someone else’s misconduct. With
the proposed mental culpability attached to the misdemeanor provision, the
prosecutor would be required to prove that the individual executive had
some intent regarding the conduct. The individual will then at least be able
to raise the defense that he did not have any knowledge or involvement with
the violation.

184. Id. at F-13.
185. CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 72, at 173–74.
186. United States v. Cordoba-Hincapie, 825 F. Supp. 485, 496 (E.D.N.Y. 1993), discussed in
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 72, at 173.
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B. PROSECUTORIAL POLICY CHANGES AND ITS IMPACT
A policy change when enforcing this provision, which includes a
rebuttable presumption of innocence187 with respect to the individual
executives, should also be adopted.188 This would be consistent with the
congressional purpose to facilitate public reliance on the integrity of
corporate officers, as well as constitutional and criminal procedure
principles that an individual is innocent until proven guilty.189 There are,
however, circumstances when figurehead executives may be criminally
liable for the alleged FDCA violations. This note is not concerned with such
instances. Instead, this note focuses on those individuals who have
absolutely no knowledge of the conduct that caused an FDCA violation and
could not possibly have realized these infractions due to the complexity and
vastness of modern manufacturing corporations.190
Furthermore, a policy change with respect to plea agreements must be
adopted. The Guidant scandal demonstrates the problems that exist under
the current policy. The government entered into a plea agreement to drop
charges against the individual executives in exchange for Guidant handing
the government a $296 million criminal fine.191 As noted in the court’s
decision that rejected the plea agreement, victims of the criminal conduct do
not get any of the money;192 it all goes to the government. This raises
several concerns. First, it limits the amount of money the victims will be
able to recover in any potential class action product liability suit. In
addition, these criminal fines merely come out of the pocket of the
shareholders,193 having little to no effect on the corporation or the
executives who allegedly committed these offenses, and thus provides no
incentive for the company or its executives to reform. It is apparent that the
government’s use of the no-intent misdemeanor provision against the
company and the figurehead executives is nothing more than a threat to
induce plea agreements that will result in exorbitant amounts of money
going into the government’s pocket.194 The prosecutor needs to do nothing
more than charge a medical device manufacturer and its executives with an
FDCA offense, making this arguably a simple and cost-effective way to
187. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 558–559 (3rd pocket ed. 2006) (defining “rebuttable
presumption” as “[a]n inference drawn from certain facts that establish a prima facie case, which
may be overcome by the introduction of contrary evidence”).
188. This would be similar to the rebuttable presumption against judicial review of duty of care
claims under the business judgment rule in corporate law. The burden of proof is placed on the
plaintiff to rebut the business judgment of the corporate officer or director, thus insulating those
individuals from liability in carrying out their corporate duties so long as the act was made in good
faith. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 539–44 (Foundation Press, 2nd ed. 2009).
189. UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW, supra note 71, at 5.
190. See generally Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-22.
191. United States v. Guidant LLC, 708 F. Supp. 2d 903, 908 (2010).
192. Id. at 909.
193. Letter to Judge Frank, supra note 167.
194. Gurney et al., supra note 1, at F-21.
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increase the government’s revenue. If the government was serious about
deterring individuals who allegedly committed criminal acts under the
FDCA, it would not have entered into a plea agreement for just monetary
penalties, but instead would have insisted on imprisoning the guilty
individuals.195 But it is clearly not the government’s intent to promote the
goals of the FDA, which are designed to protect the public and the patient.
Based on the facts given in the Guidant case, it is highly likely that the
company and its executives were liable for the alleged violations, and had
they gone forward with trial rather than entering into a plea agreement, they
would have been found guilty under the strict-liability misdemeanor
provision. Under my proposed amendment, which would require some
proof of knowledge and with the new prosecutorial policies, Guidant and its
executives would not have “gotten away with murder” like they did. In fact,
they would perhaps have faced serious and well-deserved jail time, but at
least they would have been given a fair trial.
CONCLUSION
My proposal to both amend the misdemeanor provision of the FDCA,
requiring proof of some criminal intent, and adopt prosecutorial policy
changes will achieve several goals. First, it will protect executives who had
absolutely no knowledge of or involvement in the FDCA violation.
Requiring proof of some mens rea will ensure that businesspeople are not
forced to plead guilty because they do not have a viable defense. Second, it
protects the corporation and its shareholders from having to pay exorbitant
criminal fines. Third, the policy changes will ensure that those who are
found guilty under the revised FDCA criminal provisions will be sent to jail
rather than allowing them to enter into plea agreements, which do nothing
to combat recidivism. Lastly, but most importantly, these changes will
promote the ultimate goal of ensuring that these types of violations do not
occur again, protecting patients’ health and well-being.
Kimberly Bolte*

195. Federal prosecutors are given broad discretion in defining white-collar infractions and
deciding when to bring charges against corporate individuals, which has led to overcriminalization. J. Kelly Strader, UNDERSTANDING WHITE COLLAR CRIME 8 (Matthew Bender &
Company, Inc., 2002).
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